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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-602

DONALD W. AGINS AND BONNIE G. AGINS,
Appellants

v.

CITY OF TIBURON,
Appellee

On Appeal From The Supreme Court Of California

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS AND THE CALIFORNIA BUILDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

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Amici have received the written consent of the parties to the case to file this brief. Amici adopt appellants' statements of Opinion Below, Jurisdiction, and the Case.

INTEREST OF AMICI

The National Association of Home Builders represents approximately 120,000 builder and associate members organized in 743 affiliated state and local associations in the fifty states, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Its members include not only people and companies that construct and supply single-family homes but also apartment, condominium, commercial, and industrial builders, as well as land developers and remodelers. The affiliated California Building Industry Association, composed of six regional and twenty local associations, has approximately 5,000 members that produce about seventy percent of the state's housing. The Associations' fervent interest in a just and fair approach to government use of private land, until now protected ultimately by the Constitution, will be severely affected if the decision of the court below is not reversed.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Article six of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby. . . ."

The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides in pertinent part: ". . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ."

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a state court can rule out the right of property owners to file compensatory taking, or inverse condemnation, actions in direct contravention of the United States Constitution and Supreme Court rulings thereunder.

ARGUMENT

I. The Decision of the Court Below Effectively Destroys the Right To Make a Compensatory De Facto Taking Claim Despite the Just Compensation Clause and Rulings of This Court.

In a sweeping and unprecedented policy decision that goes far beyond the circumstances of the particular case, the lower court has declared that henceforth no one may *bring a claim* under the United States and California Constitutions for inverse condemnation damages, that is, allege a de facto taking of private property by police power action without just compensation. The fifth amendment, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment (*Chicago, B.&Q.R.R.* v. *City of Chicago*, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)), prohibits not only the deprivation of property without due process of law but also, in a separate clause, the taking of property without just compensation.

By ruling that an aggrieved plaintiff may only make a claim for equitable relief, rather than a claim for damages, the lower court has effectively merged the Constitution's due process and just compensation clauses so as to preclude any claim under the latter. Aside from the violence this does to the words and meaning of the fifth amendment, it makes for irrational and unfair land use policy because a govern-

ment regulation could be legally valid, not justifying a declaratory, injunctive, or mandamus remedy, yet at the same time so harsh as to deny a person all reasonable use of his land, thereby justifying the inverse condemnation remedy (of course, a regulation could also be invalid and a taking as well.)[1] A further effect of the lower court's decision is to shift to California's federal courts all regulatory land use cases in which an allegation of unconstitutional taking without just compensation is made, thus increasing the federal judiciary's land use law caseload, a field traditionally left to the state courts.

Professor Williams summed it up best in his landmark treatise when he recognized that inverse condemnation[2] "can play a useful role as part of an overall

[1]For the importance as to remedy in the fifth amendment's distinction between deprivation and taking, *see* Comment, *Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain To Test for a Violation of Due Process or a Taking Without Just Compensation*, 54 Wash. L. Rev. 315, 319-27 (1979); D. Godschalk, et al., Constitutional Issues of Growth Management 53-64 (1977); D. Mandelker, Managing Our Urban Environment 624 (2d ed. 1971); Dunham, *From Rural Enclosure to Re-Enclosure of Urban Land*, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1238, 1253-54 (1960).

[2] Defined as "the popular description of a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency." *Thornburg* v. *Port of Portland*, 233 Or. 178, 180 n.1, 376 P.2d 100, 101 n.1 (1962); *City of Jacksonville* v. *Schumann*, 167 So.2d 95, 98 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964), *cert. denied*, 172 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1965), *cert. denied*, 390 U.S. 981 (1968) (takings found in airplane overflight cases); 11 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 32.132a (3d ed. rev. 1977). More simply, "inverse condemnation" has been described as an action "to redress a taking without compensation." *Sixth Camden Corp.* v. *Township of Evesham*, 420 F. Supp. 709, 721 (D.N.J. 1976).

land use regulation system, to provide some protection for landowners against de facto takings." 5 N. Williams, American Planning Law—Land Use and the Police Power § 159.18 (1975). More to the point, this Court as recently as last term acknowledged in a legislative immunity case the *constitutional right to file* an "inverse condemnation" action, ruling further that this was not the occasion to review the circuit court's holding that a violation of the due process clause had been adequately alleged, in which appellants had claimed that an improper exercise of the police power had led to a "taking" or an "inverse condemnation." *Lake Country Estates* v. *Tahoe Regional Planning Agency*, 99 S. Ct. 1171, 1174, 1175 n.11 (1979); *see Jacobson* v. *Tahoe Regional Planning Agency*, 566 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1977).

What this Court acknowledged as constitutionally allegable on March 5, 1979, the *Agins* court read abruptly out of the Constitution nine days later.

Lake Country Estates is the tip of an iceberg of Supreme Court taking cases stretching back a century. The first notable such case, *Pumpelly* v. *Green Bay Co.*, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871), found a compensable taking when flooding effectively destroyed a property's usefulness despite the absence of an actual appropriation for public use. It exemplifies the simplest type of inverse taking, that of physical invasion. *Pumpelly* also provides a vivid illustration of the essence of inverse condemnation (a phrase that gained prominence in the 1960's)—the transmutation of police power exercise or regulation into an exercise of compensable taking. As explained in 2 P. Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain § 6.1[1] (3d ed. rev. 1976):

> Any limitation on the free use and enjoyment of property constitutes a *taking* of property within the meaning of the *constitutional provision*. It is sufficient that the person claiming *compensation* has some right or privilege in the appropriated property, which right or privilege is destroyed, injured or abridged by such appropriation . . . .
>
> *Constitutional rights rest on substance, not on form*, and the liability to pay compensation for property taken cannot be evaded by leaving the title in the owner, while depriving him of the beneficial use of the property. It has already been shown that a legal restriction upon the use of land may constitute a taking, *although the title is unaffected and the land is physically untouched*, and the same is true when the owner's enjoyment of the land is physically interfered with although his legal rights remain unimpaired. (emphasis added).

A half century after *Pumpelly*, the philosophical underpinning of inverse condemnation gained its fullest expression in the "leading"[3] taking case of *Pennsylvania Coal Co.* v. *Mahon*, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Justice Holmes framed the question of the case as "whether the police power can be stretched so far"[4] and went on to hold *not* when "the extent of the taking is great."[5] Hence it has for years been strongly held that alleged abuse of the police power can be remedied, where proven appropriate, by constitutional just compensation. Equally important for purposes of this appeal, the *right to file* and attempt to prove such a claim is obviously implicit in the Court's result.

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[3] *Penn Central Transportation Co.* v. *New York City*, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).

[4] 260 U.S. at 413.

[5] 260 U.S. at 414.

> The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation. A similar assumption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth Amendment. [cite omitted]. When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be *qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and more* until at last private property disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the United States.
>
> *The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. . . .* We are in danger of forgetting that *a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough* to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change. As we already have said, this is a question of degree—and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions. 260 U.S. at 415-16 (emphasis added).

The *Agins* court plainly succumbed to that "natural tendency of human nature." Instead of determining if a specific case for inverse condemnation had been adequately made out, the court merely acknowledged the public value of land use planning and execution ("to improve the public condition") and then inexplicably placed that value forever above the Constitution's just compensation clause.

It is legal and social folly to strive for worthy environmental improvement (with the Agins, the city deemed their property desirable as open space for its scenic view of San Francisco Bay) by simplistically pitting the taking question as "police power" versus "eminent domain power."

> There is an almost *irresistable urge* in this matter to think of the question in terms of police power versus eminent domain—as if the choice of means for working for environmental improvement had to be either one or the other. The process of choosing means for implementing policy goals for environmental improvement thus tends to start with the premise that public agencies should first see how far they can go in requiring landowners to submit to regulatory controls of land use, and resort to eminent domain techniques only where the courts compel them to compensate landowners for a "taking" of property. Netherton, *Implementation of Land Use Policy: Police Power vs. Eminent Domain*, 3 Land & Water L. Rev. 33, 50 (1968) (emphasis added).

Netherton, explaining that the either/or approach is an unfair and unwise way to protect the community environment, argues for the judicious approach in the "gray areas between those situations where it is obvious that police power should be used and those where it is not so obvious":

> During the period of experimental regulation the landowner's interest can be protected by recourse to an action in *inverse condemnation* where he can sustain the burden of proving damages. Netherton at 55 (emphasis added).

Yielding to the "irresistable urge," the court below, despite explicit constitutional provisions against takings[6] and countless judicial rulings thereunder, has

[6] The California Constitution's just compensation clause is technically broader than that of the United States Constitution. It reads: "Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation . . . has first been paid to . . . the owner." Cal. Const. art. 1, § 19. Half the states have "damaged" provisions in their constitutions (all fifty have just compensation clauses, which have been interpreted as substantially the same as the federal clause, with or without the "damaging" language). Note, *Inverse Condemnation: The Case for Diminution in Property Value as Compensable Damage*, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 779, 779 n.2 (1976).

created an illusory distinction that, in practice, renders inverse condemnation suits nugatory in California courts. As Professor Waite, who supports *Pennsylvania Coal's* "diminution of property value" test as one way of judging when police power regulation becomes compensable, said:

> Today it is hard to justify the different compensation philosophies applied to landowners in eminent domain and police power matters . . . . [R]emembering property to be a bundle of rights, it is clear this distinction, too, is illusory. The *substantive* content of title is largely rights of use, and in *both* situations a transfer has occurred . . . Waite, *Governmental Power and Private Property*, 16 Cath. U.L. Rev. 283, 292 (1967) (emphasis added).

This distinction without a difference in the taking context,[7] implicit in *Pennsylvania Coal* and taking cases since, is perhaps most forcefully explicated by the Texas courts. In *San Antonio River Authority* v. *Garrett Brothers*, 528 S.W.2d 266, 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), where a compensable "temporary taking" was found in a city's refusal to issue utility permits for land the city might later acquire, the court explained:

[7] *See* Berger, *To Regulate, Or Not to Regulate—Is That the Question? Reflections on the Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and Private Property Rights*, 8 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 253, 268-75 (1975); Beuscher, *Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Eminent Domain By the Courts: So-Called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation*, 1968 Urb. L. Ann. 1, 4.

> If there is a taking the constitution requires payment, even though the taking be for the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, morals or welfare and, therefore, involves an exercise of the police power. [cites omitted]. *The empty formalism of "police power" cannot be made the basis for denying compensation*, and the Texas Supreme Court has expressly refused to "compartmentalize an exercise of sovereignty as either police power or eminent domain for the resolution of [taking] problems arising under [the state constitution]." (emphasis added).[8]

It is one thing to review the facts and circumstances of a case and then to reject its claims as improvidently made. It is quite another matter, however, to decide for expedient reasons that a constitutional cause of action can no longer even be raised under any circumstances for fear that it may disrupt the regular flow of governmental land use decisions. Until the *Agins* opinion, the just compensation clause has never been treated by any court as sheerly precatory language.

[8] In a later case for "inverse condemnation" damages, where a city denied a development permit in order to gain a scenic easement for the public, the court stated:

> [T]here is really no distinction between the powers of eminent domain and an exercising of the police power, when a person's property is taken or the use of same damaged by the state (or city). A person's property may not be taken or damaged as an incident to the exercise of the police power without the payment of compensation. *City of Austin* v. *Teague*, 556 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).

The state supreme court reversed on other grounds and remanded for retrial of the amount of damages and noted:

> The labels are not helpful. These two doctrines — police power and eminent domain — *merge at so many places when applied to specific problems*, that the legal battlefields have been variously termed a "sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog," . . . a "crazy-quilt pattern," . . . "the manifest illusoriness of distinctions," . . . . 570 S.W. 2d 389, 391 (Tex. 1978) (emphasis added).

II. The Decision of the Court Below Is Manifestly Contrary to the Case-By-Case Review Required by the Just Compensation Clause and Rulings of This Court.

The constitutional dilemma peremptorily sworn off by the *Agins* court was specifically addressed by this Court in *Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City*, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). A classic taking case, the issue was whether application of a regulatory land use ordinance resulted in a "temporary taking" of property without just compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 438 U.S. at 107, 119. While *Penn Central* acknowledged the high burden of proving a taking and, under the facts of the case, found no taking had occurred, *its comprehensive analysis upholds the constitutional right to make the claim and attempt to prove it under law*. This becomes absolutely fundamental because taking questions are "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" with no "set formula" to guide a court since the very question of a taking "depends largely upon the particular circumstances" of each case. 438 U.S. at 124.

Save for the erratic *Agins* opinion, the necessity of case-by-case constitutional analysis has been uniformly emphasized by courts and commentators alike. Again, Justice Holmes sets the framework in *Pennsylvania Coal*:

> Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed

under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. *So the question depends on the particular facts . . . . [I]t always is open to interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional power.* 260 U.S. at 413 (emphasis added).

In *Berman* v. *Parker*, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954), in which a property owner alleged that a land use plan for urban renewal violated both the fifth amendment's due process and just compensation clauses as applied to his land, Justice Douglas said without reservation:

> We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the police power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, *for each case must turn on its own facts.* (emphasis added) (*accord, e.g., Armstrong* v. *United States*, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960)).

And the Court in *Goldblatt* v. *Town of Hempstead*, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962), in upholding an ordinance that prevented further mining by appellant, firmly noted:

> This is not to say, however, that governmental action in the form of regulation cannot be so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensation. [cited omitted]. *There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins.* (emphasis added).

Doubtlessly, then, case-by-case determinations of whether land use controls result in compensable takings must be made. 1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 3.25 (2d ed. 1976); 11 E. McQuillin, The

Law of Municipal Corporations § 32.26 (3d ed. rev. 1977); 2 P. Nichols, *supra*, at § 6.3; 1 A. Rathkopf, Law of Planning and Zoning § 6.02 (4th ed. 1978); 2 P. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 7.03[3][d] (1978); Van Alstyne, *Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria*, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 13-48 (1970); Waite, *supra*, at 289. Otherwise, the very words of the just compensation clause ring hollow. "The issue of regulation as against taking is always a matter of degree." *Morris County Land Improvement Co.* v. *Township of Parsippany - Troy Hills*, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232, 241 (1963); *accord, e.g., Donohoe Construction Co.* v. *Montgomery County Council*, 567 F.2d 603, 608 n.13 (4th Cir. 1977); *Dahl* v. *City of Palo Alto*, 372 F. Supp. 647, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1974); *Brecciaroli* v. *Connecticut Commissioner of Environmental Protection*, 168 Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948, 951-52 (1975); *Bureau of Mines* v. *George's Creek Coal and Land Co.*, 272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748 (1974); *Commissioner of Natural Resources* v. *S. Volpe & Co.*, 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666, 669-70 (1965); *Aronson* v. *Town of Sharon*, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341, 345 (1964); *Penn Central Transportation Co.* v. *New York City*, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), *aff'd*, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); *City of Austin* v. *Teague*, 570 S.W.2d 389, 393 (Tex. 1978).

The ineluctable logic and reasonableness of what the law has been is reflected in what the law should be as well. The American Law Institute advocates that:

> The particular circumstances of *each case* must be examined to see on which side of the regulation/taking line it falls. [cites omitted].

> This Code authorizes the payment of compensation in those cases in which the agency feels that the elimination of existing uses would impose too great a burden on the property owner. (§5-102). The Code makes no attempt to define the conditions under which compensation *must* [emphasis in original] be paid. *This is a basic constitutional issue that can be left to case-by-case decision* . . . . Under this Code a landowner who convinces a court that a regulation is unconstitutionally restrictive *may obtain compensation* or a declaration of the regulation's invalidity. (§9-111). ALI Model Land Development Code 155-56 (1976) (emphasis added).

Thus inverse condemnation actions clearly form an organic and inseparable part of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The "authority is overwhelming" that confiscatory regulation gives rise to such relief.[9] Indeed, de facto taking claims have become so commonplace in American legal theory that courts have developed four sometimes overlapping approaches for supporting an award of damages for an unconstitutional taking of property. D. Godschalk, et al., Constitutional Issues of Growth Management 53-64 (1977); Michelman, *Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law*, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1183-1201 (1967); Sax, *Takings, Private Property and Public Rights*, 81 Yale L.J. 149, 151 (1971); *Developments in the Law—Zoning*, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1427, 1462-1501 (1978). These approaches, or tests, are generally referred to as those for:

[9] Berger, *supra* note 7, at 279. Professor Dunham, in a seminal article, reasons that the inverse condemnation remedy would check arbitrary land use regulation by striking a constitutional balance between public gain and private cost. Dunham, *supra* note 1. In addition to Berger and Dunham, two other noted land use law professors provide lucid discussions of the social need, as well as constitutional requirement, for compensatory regulation via the inverse condemnation remedy. *See* Beuscher, *supra* note 7; Hagman, *Compensable Regulation: A Way of Dealing with Wipeouts from Land Use Controls?*, 54 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 45 (1976).

1) *physical invasion* — the elementary approach, represented by *Pumpelly* and *Griggs v. Allegheny County*, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (airplane overflight case); but as stated in *Penn Central*, "we do not embrace the proposition that a 'taking' can never occur unless government has transferred physical control over a portion of a parcel." 438 U.S. at 123 n.25;

2) *diminution of value* — the approach exemplified by *Pennsylvania Coal*, in which a regulation that causes an excessive decline in a property's market value effects a taking;

3) *nuisance abatement* — if a regulation prevents a harm (abates a nuisance) no compensable taking occurs, but if it confers a benefit on the public then damages are awarded; this test, formulated in E. Freund, The Police Power §511 (1904), finds examples in the *Agins*-like *Dahl*, *supra* (rezoning property to open space in order to avoid cost of acquisition gives rise to constitutional "inverse condemnation" action), and *State* v. *Griggs*, 89 Ariz. 70, 358 P.2d 174 (1960) (a regulation that saves government money rather than protects the public health or safety from an injurious use of land is an unconstitutional taking without compensation; *cf. Cardon Oil Co.* v. *City of Phoenix*, 122 Ariz. 102, 593 P.2d 656 (1979)); and,

4) *balancing of interests* — the broadest test, this weighs the public good against private detriment, considering such factors as a regulation's duration and impact on use of land, the harm sought to be cured, and whether objective studies support the need and scope of the regulation; its essence, as Professor Michelman would emphasize, is that of "fairness" (*see, e.g., Brecciaroli, supra,* and *Village of Willoughby Hills* v. *Corrigan,* 29 Ohio St.2d 39, 278 N.E.2d 658 (1972)).

The stunningly absolutist approach adopted by the lower court, however, patently denies any constitutional analysis and thereby begs the taking question before it can be rightfully posed. Since the 1960's, land use law has become far more than planning, zoning, subdivision, and urban renewal, and now encompasses more complex issues of environmental regulation, historic preservation, transfers of development rights, growth management, and all facets of how land is to be used, developed, and controlled, balancing private rights with public needs. Turning the salient constitutional issue of differing applications of land use regulation into an either/or contest unnecessarily belittles both the Constitution and conservation. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts so presciently observed:

> The [government] argue[s] as though all that need be done is to demonstrate a public purpose and then no regulation in the interests of conservation can be too extreme. . . An unrecognized taking in the guise of regulation is worse than confiscation. . .
>
> In this conflict between the ecological and the constitutional, *it is plain that neither is to be consumed by the other. Commissioner of Natural Resources* v. *S. Volpe & Co.*, 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666, 671 (1965) (emphasis added).

Compensatory takings thus occur primarily in two critical situations: whenever a zoning ordinance precludes reasonable use of a property, and whenever a government places an undue and uncompensated burden on an individual landowner in order to achieve a public good. 1 A. Rathkopf, *supra. Agins,* on its face, includes classic taking issue elements:[10] a report prepared for the city as part of its planning process noting the suitability for acquisition of the Agins' property for open space, the rezoning of the property to a lower density called "residential planned development and open space zone," and the filing, then subsequent abandonment, of an eminent domain action against the property. Compensatory takings in the land use context have been found or permissibly alleged time after time in cases with elements such as these. Well known examples from across the nation include:

Zoning — Sixth Camden Corp. v. *Township of Evesham,* 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976) (inverse con-

[10] The issue raised by this appeal certainly is not limited to cases that never reach the trial stage but nonetheless make the requisite taking allegations. A parallel appeal will shortly be filed in this Court in which, after trial, an inverse taking was found and affirmed and damages awarded (*San Diego Gas & Electric Co.* v. *City of San Diego*, 81 Cal. App. 3d 844, 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1978)); on appeal, the state supreme court retransferred the case back to the lower appellate court in light of the *Agins* opinion, and the appellate court then reversed its prior decision. No. 16277 (4th D.C.A. Cal., June 26, 1979), hearing denied, Cal. Sup. Ct., Aug. 22, 1979. The *San Diego* case, like *Agins*, involved downzoning and adoption of an open space element in a general plan.

demnation action under fifth and fourteenth amendments); *Dahl, supra* (inverse condemnation, open space rezoning); *Klopping* v. *City of Whittier*, 8 Cal.3d 39, 500 P.2d 1354, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972) (inverse condemnation); *Petersen* v. *City of Decorah*, 259 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa App. 1977); *Aronson, supra; Morris County Land Improvement Co., supra* (to keep land in substantially natural state); *Village of Willoughby Hills, supra;*

Subdivision, development – Hotel Coamo Springs, Inc. v. *Hernandez Colon*, 426 F. Supp. 664 (D.P.R. 1976); *Lomarch Corp.* v. *Englewood*, 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968) ("temporary taking"); *City of Austin* v. *Teague*, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978) (inverse condemnation, denial of permit to gain scenic easement); *San Antonio River Authority, supra* ("temporary taking");

Planning – Washington Market Enterprises, Inc. v. *City of Trenton*, 68 N.J. 107, 343 A.2 408 (1975);

Police power combinations – Donohoe Construction Co., supra (planning, zoning, subdivision, building permit actions); *Sanfilippo* v. *County of Santa Cruz*, 415 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (inverse condemnation, planning and zoning); *Peacock* v. *County of Sacramento*, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969) (inverse condemnation, planning, zoning, and subdivision actions);

Other police power regulations – Pete v. *United States*, 209 Ct. Cl. 270, 531 F.2d 1018 (1976) (inverse condemnation, ban of barges within federal park to maintain natural state); *Bydlon* v. *United States*, 146 Ct. Cl. 764, 175 F. Supp. 891 (1959) (ban of low-level

air travel over national forest to maintain natural state); and,

Eminent domain (dilatory or abandoned) – Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. *City of St. Louis*, 596 F.2d 784 (8th Cir. 1979); *Richmond Elks Hall Association* v. *Richmond Redevelopment Agency*, 561 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1977) (inverse condemnation); *Foster* v. *City of Detroit*, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); *Madison Realty Co.* v. *City of Detroit*, 315 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Mich. 1970); *Haczela* v. *City of Bridgeport*, 299 F. Supp. 709 (D. Conn. 1969); *Benenson* v. *United States*, 212 Ct. Cl. 375, 548 F.2d 939 (1977) (inverse condemnation); *Drakes Bay Land Co.* v. *United States*, 191 Ct. Cl. 389, 424 F.2d 574 (1970); *Hardesty* v. *State Roads Commission*, 276 Md. 25, 343 A.2d 884 (1975) (scenic easement); *Lincoln Loan Co.* v. *State Highway Commission*, 274 Or. 49, 545 P.2d 105 (1976); *Miller* v. *City of Beaver Falls*, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951); *In re Cornell Industrial Electric, Inc.*, 19 Pa. Commw. 599, 338 A.2d 752 (1975).

The Supreme Court opinions in *Pumpelly, Pennsylvania Coal,* and *Penn Central* are major pronouncements of the unwavering constitutional principle that private property cannot be appropriated via exercise of the police power without payment of just compensation. The above litany of cases bears that principle out as well as the more fundamental point that the fifth and fourteenth amendments insure, at minimum, *the right to make a claim for a taking of property.*

> Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a "personal" right. . . . In fact, a *fundamental interde-*

> *pendence* exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other. *That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized. Lynch* v. *Household Finance Corp.*, 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (emphasis added).

The severe and singular approach adopted in *Agins*, denying for the future any chance for a case-by-case taking analysis, flies in the face of both the Constitution and Supreme Court rulings thereunder. At its heart, the Constitution seeks that necessary balance between individual rights, personal and property, and public necessity. That is the essence of fairness, and, at bottom, the value of constitutional scrutiny.

III. The Decision of the Court Below Violates the Supremacy Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.

Under the supremacy clauses of the United States and California Constitutions,[11] the courts are bound by the terms of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. *See, e.g., Cooper* v. *Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); *Marbury* v. *Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); 1 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 25 (8th ed. 1927). No ruling of a state court can negate the meaning of the federal Constitution's provisions as interpreted by this Court. 16 Am. Jur. 2d *Const. Law* §§50, 54 (1964, Supp. 1978). Yet, as the above arguments have shown, the court below has not only greatly misinterpreted the Constitution's just compensation clause

[11] "This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . . ." U.S. Const. art. 6. ". . . [T]he United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land." Cal. Const. art. 3, § 1.

but has also plainly ignored the many rulings of this Court regarding compensatory de facto takings and the necessity for case-by-case factual inquiries. Having based its decision upon the Constitution, the court below should be held to it.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court should note probable jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted,

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October 1979

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify on this twenty-second day of October, 1979, that three copies of this brief amici curiae were air mailed postage prepaid to counsel for appellants, John P. Pollock, Pollock, Williams & Berwanger, 800 West Sixth Street, Los Angeles, California 90017, and to counsel for appellee, Robert I. Conn, Town Attorney, 1534 Fifth Avenue, San Rafael, California 94901.

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